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The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) provide the institutional 
framework for the conduct of fiscal policies within the European Monetary Union. The Maastricht 
Treaty specifies that EU fiscal policies are run nationally, following EU-wide objectives defined on 
a yearly base by the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (Ecofin) in the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines
1 (BEPGs) and within the limits set by the SGP. The SGP stipulates that countries 
should aim for public budgets close to balance or in surplus, and sets an upper bound to national 
deficits as a proportion of GDP (3%), making exception only for large shocks
2. Countries are 
required to submit yearly their Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) to the European 
Council. National fiscal policies are regularly scrutinised to assess their conformity with the BEPGs 
and with the announced SCPs. Countries failing to comply with the BEPGs or the SCPs are subject 
to censure by the other EU members. Only unjustified breaches of the 3% ceiling set in the SGP 
cause the adoption of sanctions towards a country
3.  
                                                            
1 The BEPGs are actually more comprehensive than the fiscal policy guidelines included in the SGP, as they also 
consider recommendations in areas such as structural reform and labour market developments.    
2 The SGP was adopted as part of a resolution agreed by the Amsterdam European Council of 17 June 1997. The main 
aim of the SGP was that of strengthening the Maastricht Treaty provisions on enforcing fiscal discipline. The SGP 
envisaged that in the absence of the exchange rate instrument in EMU there would be a greater need for automatic fiscal 
stabilisers at national level and this would make it "necessary to ensure that national budgetary policies support 
stability oriented monetary policies". Hence the key commitment of the SGP is to set the "￿ medium-term objective of 
budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus￿" which "￿ will allow all Member States to deal with normal 
cyclical fluctuations while keeping the government deficit within the reference value of 3% of GDP". The sanctions for 
breaking the 3% upper ceiling are specified in the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) which is specified by Council 
Regulation 1467/97 included in the SGP. The EDP sets out that the Council, on the basis of opinions from the 
Commission and Ecofin within three months of the reporting deadlines of March 1 and September 1 each year, can 
declare an excessive deficit unless it is considered to be exceptional and temporary. Excessive and temporary deficits 
are defined as resulting from: (i) an unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned and has a major 
impact on the financial position of the general government; or (ii) from a severe economic downturn (if there is an 
annual fall of real GDP of at least 2%).  
 
3 The sanctions come into force at the latest ten months after the Council has identified an excessive deficit if the 
country concerned does not take effective corrective action. The sanctions take the form of a non-interest-bearing 
deposit with the Commission equal to 0.2% of GDP plus an amount linked to the size of the deficit, subject to an annual 
upper limit of 0.5% of GDP. If after two years the Council decides that the excessive deficit has not been corrected, the 
deposit becomes a fine which can be shared amongst member states not subject to excessive deficits in proportion to 
their share in total GNP. 3 
  In practice the Council has so far shied away from declaring an excessive deficit. This 
despite the fact that three countries have breached the 3% deficit ceiling: France, Germany, and 
Portugal. 
The rationale for the SGP fiscal arrangements lies in the political distortions that generate 
excessive debt accumulation and in the externalities that characterise national debt policies within a 
monetary union
4. Whilst this has created a general consensus on the need for fiscal discipline, the 
specific features of the SGP have been widely criticised.  
For instance, the adoption of a uniform deficit ceiling, which is a “one size fits all” policy, 
does not take into account structural differences across countries, such as different stocks of 
outstanding debt, or the asymmetric effects on demand and output of national fiscal policies. In 
addition, by focusing on the size of the budget deficits the SGP provides (at best) a limited 
discipline for national fiscal policies that do not breach the 3% ceiling. This criticism is based on 
two arguments. The first is that the Pact does not contain adequate incentives for the creation of 
surpluses during economic expansions (Bean 1998, CESifo 2002, Canzoneri and Diba 2001). One 
could argue that the risk of being forced to implement a procyclical deficit-reduction policy in the 
face of a recession should induce governments to adopt symmetric fiscal policies. Unfortunately, 
distorted political incentives, one of the rationales for the Pact in the first place, are such as to 
induce national governments to underestimate potential fiscal deficits from prospective future 
recessions. The second point is that, in the present institutional set-up, the BEPGs
 should provide 
guidance to national fiscal policies within the limits imposed by the SGP. Von Hagen and 
Mundschenk (2001, p. 24) argue that the BEPGs enforcing mechanism is weak as is relies only on 
moral suasion or reputation-damaging peer pressure. They also point out that there is a loose 
connection between the typical budgetary cycle and the discussion of national SCPs. As a result, 
countries like France and Germany have been able to undertake significant tax adjustments without 
                                                            
4 For a comprehensive survey, see Beetsma and Debrun (2002). 4 
  even mentioning them in their SCPs. The European Commission (2000) remarks that quite 
often the measures taken or planned within the SCPs are not thoroughly explained, preventing an 
effective process of peer review within Ecofin. The behaviour of national fiscal policies between 
1998 and 2000 supports these criticisms. During this period of transition to EMU, despite a good 
growth record in Euroland, the progress towards fiscal consolidation was very slow (CESifo 2002). 
Thus, the SGP’s reputation appears tarnished and a number of revisions are repeatedly suggested
5 
by both academics and policy-makers. Many commentators point to the need to make the pact more 
focused on debt sustainability. In fact, it has been recently argued that deficits should be made 
conditional on past debt levels, thus penalising past profligacy. In the paper, we provide analytical 
content for such a proposal, showing that a simple deficit reversal rule would achieve a better 
combination of fiscal flexibility and discipline than the current deficit ceiling. 
Building on the work by Jensen (1994), we present a model where it is assumed that political 
incentives bias the policymaker’s preferences against a policy of debt reduction. As a result, the 
steady state solution of the model is characterised by debt-induced fiscal distortions and inflationary 
pressures. On one hand, this outcome is consistent with the popular wisdom calling for the adoption 
of institutional constraints on fiscal policies. On the other hand, it is intuitively obvious that our 
results confirm standard criticisms of the SGP deficit ceiling. Discretionary fiscal policies consistent 
with the ceiling still retain the bias towards excessive debt accumulation, while the ceiling itself 
causes inefficient stabilisation in the face of large and persistent shocks.  
As a simple alternative to the deficit ceilings envisaged in the SGP, we advocate the 
adoption of deficit targets. National governments should retain discretion in setting deviations from 
targets, but these deviations should then be reversed following a predetermined rule. The proposed 
rule obtains fiscal discipline when the SGP would allow for excessive discretion and leaves room 
for stabilisation policies when the SGP ceiling would be binding. Furthermore, it is immune from 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 5 
  the “one size fits all” criticism because countries retain full discretion in the choice of 
temporary deviations from the announced paths. 
The crux of the matter obviously is that our proposal, like any other institutional 
arrangement, requires an adequate enforcement technology. If the sanctions envisaged in the SGP 
(or at least the reputational costs attached to a breach of the 3% ceiling) are deemed sufficient to 
lend credibility to the SGP, similar arrangements should work for the simple rule proposed here. 
However, stricter supervision of national policies by European institutions is certainly needed. In 
the paper we sketch out some of the institutional arrangements designed to implement the system of 
checks and balances sufficient to support the credibility of the proposed rule.  
In a nutshell, we argue that: 
1. Governments should make binding announcements on the future reversal of temporary 
deviations from announced deficit targets. 
2. The Eurogroup should be given substantive sanctioning powers against non-complying 
governments. 
3.  The rule suggested in (1) would apply irrespective of the level of the deficit, thus providing 
more discipline than the current 3% ceiling. However, we contemplate specific provisions for 
national decisions to breach the 3% ceiling. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
discusses the policy rules and the steady state solutions. Section 4 evaluates the performance of the 
proposed institutional arrangements. Section 5 discusses the implications for EMU institutional 
design. Section 6 concludes showing that our scheme fares quite well in comparison with pre-
existing reform proposals. Furthermore, it proves robust to standard criticisms of the SGP motivated 
by the concern for structural policies. In fact the rule can be easily amended to allow governments to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 See Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2003) for a survey of recent proposals. 6 
  temporarily increase deficits in order to finance public investment or to implement structural 
reforms aimed at improving the debt/GDP ratio in the longer run. 
2. The model  
Consider a monetary union formed by n economies
6. In each of them, the government provides a 
certain amount of public goods 
i
t G  financed by means of distortionary taxes
7 
i
t τ  and public debt 
accumulation 
i
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where 
i
t D  denotes the stock of government debt at the end of period t and r  is the real rate of 
interest
8. 
The economy’s supply function
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where output deviations from the socially optimal level, 
i
t y , depend on distortionary taxes, a shock 
i
t ε , independently and identically distributed with zero mean and variance
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B
t π  is the inflation rate set by the union’s central bank and  ()
B
t E π  is 
expected inflation.  
National policymakers set their fiscal policies to minimise the following loss function: 
                                                            
6 All variables are in logs. Equation (1) is a logarithmic approximation to the government budget constraint, where all 
variables are normalised by non-distortionary output, as in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997). 
 
7 Following Alesina and Tabellini (1987) we define τ as a tax rate on the total revenue of firms. 
 
8 To limit the analytical complexity of the model we assume that r is constant and government debt is fully indexed, as in 
Jensen (1994) and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997). The r.h.s. term of eq. (2) does not include seigniorage revenues. It is 
well known that in modern economies the limited amount of domestic money holdings relative to GDP severely 
constrains the possibility of raising anticipated seigniorage revenues. For sake of simplicity we therefore neglect this 
component of the budget constraint. None of our results would significantly change if we modeled seigniorage revenues. 
The proof of this claim is available on request. 
  
9 For sake of simplicity we assume that the union goods market is fully integrated and perfectly competitive. 
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 define respectively the policymaker’s 
targets for inflation, public expenditures and debt. For the sake of simplicity, we postulate that 
policymakers’ preferences are symmetric across the countries. 
 The assumption that the loss function is quadratic in output, expenditures and inflation is 
standard in the literature since the seminal contribution of Alesina and Tabellini (1987)
10. The 
inclusion of a quadratic term in debt is perhaps more controversial and requires some discussion, 
although it can be found in Tabellini (1986). The argument is better understood discussing what 
happens when it is postulated that  0 3 = k  and the policymaker retains full discretion in the conduct 
of both fiscal and monetary policy, as in Jensen (1994). In this case re-invested budget surpluses 
build up a stock of negative debt in steady state, earning the income necessary to entirely finance the 
desired level of expenditures. As a result, tax distortions and inflation disappear. It is intuitively 
obvious that Jensen’s result cannot hold if the policymaker pursues a non-negative debt target, as in 
(3). The persistence of excessive debt levels – which cause steady-state tax distortions – has several 
explanations. It may be seen as the consequence of electoral competition when policymakers 
disagree about the composition or the level of public expenditures (Alesina and Tabellini, 1989; 
Persson and Svensson 1989). To account for it, another strand of literature emphasises the role of 
intergenerational conflict (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989). A non-distortionary steady-state 
equilibrium implies that current generations bear the costs of running budget surpluses in order to 
relieve future generations from the burden of distortionary taxation. This outcome might hold in a 
world where generations are altruistically linked through bequests, so that the intertemporal 
                                                            
10 Quadratic formulations of the loss function may look unduly restrictive. However (3) may be viewed as an acceptable 
approximation to a more general utility function. With this justification, the policymaker’s loss functions is assumed to 
be quadratic even in models that explicitly model the representative agent’s preferences (Rotemberg and Woodford, 
1997, 1999; Dixit and Lambertini, 2000).  8 
  distribution of deficits only responds to efficiency considerations. Yet, fiscal policy may be 
biased towards excessive debt accumulation if some individuals are bequest constrained – i.e. they 
would like to borrow from future generations leaving negative bequests. In fact, public debt policy 
allows bequest-constrained individuals to raise their consumption levels at the expenses of future 
generations. This happens because deficits are used to subsidise the consumption of bequest-
constrained agents, whereas debt will partly substitute capital in the portfolio of non bequest-
constrained individuals.  
Thus, the loss function (3) may be interpreted as follows: i) the target D
~
 defines the level of 
debt which would emerge if non-distortionary taxes were available in a world where bequest-
constrained individuals affect politico-economic equilibria; ii)  3 k  represents the political cost of 
tolerating debt deviations from D
~ 11. Finally, the literature on fiscal policy games has pointed out 
that political incentives induce governments to postpone fiscal adjustment, causing excessive 
reliance on debt to finance expenditures. To capture this effect, we assume that the government 
discount factor is inefficiently low, i.e.  * β β <
12 (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1997).  
  Monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank, who directly controls the 









































                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
11 This is an admittedly rough-and-ready way to incorporate adverse political incentives into the policymaker’s 
behaviour and to obtain the persistence of inefficient tax distortions in steady-state equilibrium. We adopt it because 
extending the Cuckierman and Meltzer framework to account for distortionary taxation and time–inconsistency in 
monetary policy would quickly render their model unsuitable for the analysis of monetary regimes. By the same token, 
explicitly modeling electoral incentives as in Alesina and Tabellini (1988) would unnecessarily complicate the algebra 
unless one made the additional assumption that central bank policies affect electoral outcomes. Exploring such an 
hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
  
12 A policy maker’s discount factor may vary over time. In particular it may be closer to the social optimum at the 
beginning rather than at the end of her term in office.  As electoral cycles differ across countries, it may well be the case 
that in each period policymakers from different countries exhibit a different discount factor . Still, allowing for this 
possibility would not alter the conclusions of the model. 9 
  where the parameter  0 > γ  accounts for idiosyncratic central bank aversion to inflation without 
necessarily implying weight-conservatism.  
 
3. The policy game  
The policymakers and the central bank minimise (3) and (4) respectively.
 We assume that the fiscal 
and monetary authorities act non co-operatively. We then focus on a Nash-Markov equilibrium 
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t D    , τ  for  n i ...... 1 = .  
  Let us start with the analysis of monetary policy. By taking the national debt stocks as 
given, the central bank ignores the intertemporal effects of monetary policy actions. Therefore the 
first order condition for monetary policy is static: 
  () 0 ~ 1
2
1







t t k y
n
 (5) 
Condition (5) equates the marginal costs of inflation to the perceived benefits in terms of output 
expansion following a monetary surprise. 
  As for fiscal policy, observe that in each country taxes will be set to equate the marginal 
benefits of a tax-financed increase in expenditures to the marginal costs of higher taxes, i.e. the 
ensuing output distortions:  
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π π  (8) 
The analysis of debt policy requires a careful discussion. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997) point out 
that delegation to an independent central bank induces strategic use of the debt policy, in order to 
influence next period expected inflation while current inflation is taken as given. If expected future 
inflation is deemed excessively high by the fiscal authority, the latter cuts down the amount of debt-
financed expenditures. This policy reduces future tax distortions and inflation expectations, but 
increases current levels of taxes and inflation
14. For any  n i ...... 1 = , the first order condition for debt 
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ρ  captures the perceived effect of a change in current debt policy on 
inflation expectations.  As shown in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), it is decreasing in n because 
governments do not internalise the effects of other fiscal policymakers actions on inflation 
expectations. Thus, incentives to accumulate debt increase when national policymakers act non-
cooperatively. 
Making use of (1), (2), (5), (6) (9) and (10), the solutions
15 for debt, expenditures and inflation are 
as follows: 
  () ()













1  (11) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
14 Equations (7) and  (8) confirm that a fall in expenditures is matched by an increase in taxes. 
 
15 As the equilibrium is symmetric, we omit the country suffix. 11 
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where: 


























































Equation (11) defines debt dynamics, which are stable if  () r + > Θ 1 ˆ . We assume this to be the case. 
Equations (14) and (15) identify the steady-state levels of debt and expenditures,  ss D ˆ  and  ss g ˆ  
respectively. It is easy to see that a negative expenditure gap and tax distortions persist in steady 
state unless  r G D /
~ ~
− = . 
  Turning to the analysis of deviations from the steady state, observe that Θ ˆ  is increasing in 
β  and decreasing in n
16. Thus, the more short-sighted are the governments relative to a social 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
16 This is true for () 1 1
2 > + β r , which we assume to hold. In fact, Tirelli (2000) shows that failing this condition the 
intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied only under a balanced budget rule.  12 
  planner ( * β β < ) or the larger is the union, the stronger is the persistence of debt deviations 
from steady state (equation 11). Therefore, for any n, the debt dynamics are inefficient as long as 
* β β < . The sensitivity of expenditures to the current debt burden (equation 12) may be interpreted 
instead as follows. A change in  () 1 ) 1 ( − + t d E r  must be matched by a symmetric adjustment in the 





























 defines the proportion of the total adjustment
17 
implemented immediately. Such a proportion falls with the discount factor and the size of the union. 
It is easy to see that for  1 = n  we get the solution for the case of fiscal cooperation (Beetsma and 
Bovenberg, 1997). Taxes and expenditures become more sensitive to shocks, and steady state debt 
falls as a result. 
 
4. The working of a deficit reversal rule  
So far we have characterised an equilibrium which is inefficient due to i) an excessive debt target; 
ii) a downward biased discount factor. Let us assume that a commitment technology exists such that 
a debt target may be imposed on the fiscal policymaker and that any discretionary choice of 
financing current expenditures by means of debt must be reversed in the future at the rate α . In this 
case, the intertemporal first order condition for debt becomes: 
  () () 0 ) 1 (
~
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It is straightforward to show that by setting  r G D
T /
~ ~
− =  and  β β α / * = , we obtain: 
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17 Observe that ( ) 0 ˆ / 1 ˆ > Θ − Θ  is a necessary condition for stability. It is interesting to observe that the stability condition 
() r + > Θ 1 ˆ can be reinterpreted as a ceiling to the proportion of adjustment shifted onto the future. 
 13 
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Fiscal distortions are completely eliminated, the expenditure gap is nil in steady state and the 
excessive persistence of debt dynamics disappears. Note that the framework can be generalised to 
one where the shocks are persistent rather than white noise, and that this will imply an optimal path 
for expenditure which will remove the fiscal distortions. 
 
5. Implications for EMU 
For practical purposes, the above proposal is easily modified to make it compatible with current 
EMU institutional arrangements. In fact, for any given level of debt inherited at the inception of the 
scheme, the debt target can be translated into a sequence of deficit targets. Then, EMU institutions 
should force each country to reverse past deviations from the announced deficit target at a 
predetermined rate. In particular, an unexpected deficit increase at time t should be reversed by an 14 
  adequate correction of subsequent deficits, such that the autoregressive pattern of debt 
deviation from steady state is given by () Θ + / 1 r , as in equation (22).  
The crux of the matter is obviously whether the enforcement technology would be effective 
in ensuring that a sequence of deficit targets following a shock (a one-off or persistent shock) is 
adhered to by each country. Two points can be made about this. First, if the enforcement mechanism 
envisaged for the SGP through the EDP (i.e. monetary sanctions and reputational costs attached to a 
breach of the 3% ceiling) is already considered to be effective, similar arrangements could be put in 
place for the simple rule proposed here. Countries deviating from a planned sequence of deficit 
targets could incur fines. Second, if the shock  t ε  were private information to the fiscal 
policymakers, an incentive would obviously exist to fudge the scheme by distorting information, 
and delaying adjustment indefinitely. In our view, national data are almost common knowledge 
among the relevant institutions (the European Commission, the ECB, the European Council). By 
initiative of the European Commission, further progress in this direction is already under way
18. 
Once national shocks are de facto common knowledge, as it is the case in EMU, a system of checks 
and balances is what is required to induce national governments to adopt adequate stabilisation 
policies. In the following, we present an arrangement that achieves this goal introducing limited 
adjustments in the EMU institutional set-up.  
Binding announcements. The centrepiece of our proposal is that each government is 
required to announce a multi-year sequence of deficit targets. These targets constitute a 
precommitment on the part of the fiscal authorities, and are ex post to assess their actual behaviour. 
For these targets to be credible an institutional set-up is needed that ensures that deviations from 
target are not systematically disregarded. The literature on the optimal trade-off between credibility 
and flexibility suggests that ex-post deviations of actual policies from announced targets should be 
made “costly” (Lohmann 1992). This is essentially the spirit of the SGP and we agree with it. Still, 
                                                            
18 See European Commission (2001a). 15 
  deviations from announced targets can be made costly without giving up flexibility. A country 
willing to exceed the announced deficit targets should obtain the approval of the other Union 
members. Moreover, the required policy change should be accompanied by a specification of the 
subsequent correction in future deficit and expenditure levels consistent with the policy rules (19)-
(21). These will become the new benchmarks for future policy assessments. 
Enforcement powers. What the SGP and current EMU institutions arguably do not provide 
is adequate enforcement powers. The existing SGP ceilings will be breached in 2003 by France and 
Germany, having been breached in the past by Portugal, and Germany seems unlikely given its 
taxation reform plans to bring its deficit back below the ceiling even in 2004. The fact that the 
existing SGP has become discredited is not the only reason for the lack of enforcement. The one 
important lesson from central bank independence is that it has worked best where the central bank 
(or the members of its policy committee) are individually accountable to a higher authority
19. The 
problem in the case of EMU is that there is no obvious higher authority. One alternative would be to 
constitute an independent body of experts who would judge whether deviations from planned deficit 
targets constitute a breach of the target (see e.g. Wyplosz, 2002). However, there is a strong feeling 
amongst EU countries that delegating these powers to a non-political body would be seen as undue 
interference by an unelected body in the fiscal affairs of the individual countries. This suggests that 
the enforcement has to continue to rely on peer review.  
The Euro12-group could be called upon to express a binding opinion about (proposed) 
deviations from announced targets. Such an opinion will be based on EMU-wide macroeconomic 
implications of the new policy course. Should a country disregard the Euro12-group opinion, it 
would be subject to pecuniary sanctions. In contrast with the current arrangement (Artis and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 In the case of the Bank of England, the members of the Monetary Policy Committee are individually accountable to 
the UK Parliament. 
 16 
  Winkler 1998; Casella 1999), the implementation of sanctions should not be at the discretion, 
but automatic. 
To avoid the pre-eminence of specific national interests within the Euro12-group, we 
propose that any decision should respect an equal treatment principle, i.e. countries experiencing 
similar cyclical conditions should be allowed a symmetric adjustment of their fiscal stances if they 
wish so. Decisions should be based on publicly disclosed motivations concerning the Union-wide 
effects of national policies and should take into account the ECB's opinion
20 about the inflationary 
consequences of the policy change. Finally, the European Commission should be appointed as 
agenda setter for the Euro12-group meetings
21. 
Surveillance procedure. The Amsterdam Treaty (art. 99) assigns the European Commission 
with the task of monitoring economic developments and policies in member states. Given our 
emphasis on a broader set of policy targets, the Commission surveillance tasks should be extended 
accordingly. The European Commission (2001a) itself has recently put forward some practical 
suggestions aimed at improving EU budgetary surveillance. We favour the outright adoption of such 
proposals. 
Should the deficit ceiling be discarded altogether? 
One might argue that the arrangements proposed here could effectively restrain individual 
governments, but would provide little discipline in case of a multilateral decision to deviate from 
the rule
22. This is the main weakness of peer review as opposed to the appointment of an 
independent commission to scrutinise fiscal targets. In this regard, the 3% deficit ceiling would 
                                                            
20 At the present, the ECB plays a role in the policy coordination process via the Economic and Financial Committee 
(EFC). The latter consists of representatives of national administrations and central banks, of the European Commission 
and the ECB itself. The EFC has an advisory and preparatory role for the European Council meetings. Our proposal 
strengthens the ECB’s role in the policymaking process, extending the accountability mechanism and favouring co-
ordination between monetary and fiscal policy. 
 
21 At present, the Euro12-group meetings are chaired by one of the finance ministers of EMU members.  
 
22 In our model the effects of fiscal collusion are ambiguous. On the one hand, incentives to rely on debt financed 
expenditures fall because national governments correctly internalise the inflationary consequences of their actions. On 
the other hand, they might agree to postpone the deficit reversal scheme. 17 
  prove more difficult to elude, providing a simple, clear-cut rule that the public opinion can 
easily understand. This point cannot be easily dismissed. In our view, a country (a group of 
countries) should be allowed to increase its deficit beyond that ceiling if: i) the same country 
commits to a subsequent reversal along the lines spelled out above; ii) the remaining Euro12-group 
members agree to implement policies such that the Union-wide deficit does not exceed the 3% 
limit. This rests on the important argument that EMU price stability depends on the global fiscal 
stance (Von Hagen and Mundshenk 2001; Casella 2000b). As for decisions entailing a breach of the 
3% deficit rule at the Union level, Onorante (2002) shows that empowering the ECB with the right 
to choose the excess deficit would entirely remove any spending bias and leave room for enough 
fiscal flexibility. This solution may not be feasible, as it would cause undue political pressures on 
the ECB. A viable alternative is to require that the Euro12-group and the ECB issue a public 
statement arguing the case for their preferred policy stances, leaving the final decision to a qualified 
majority within the Euro12-group.  
 
Conclusions 
Recent contributions emphasise that fiscal rules should be transparent, simple, flexible, 
enforceable, adequate for the final goal (Kopits and Symansky, 1998). Judged by these criteria, our 
proposal passes the test. Compared to the SGP, it leaves room for flexibility in bad times (when the 
SGP may prove unduly restrictive) and imposes discipline in good times (when the SGP cannot bite 
because it is asymmetric). Just like the SGP, our proposal leaves enforcement powers in the hands 
of the collective will of national governments. Thus the credibility of the scheme ultimately rests on 
the reputational damage that would derive from the breach of a rule which is widely understood.    
Our scheme performs quite well also when compared to other reform proposals. Wyplosz 
(2002) argues that the task of setting budget deficits and achieving long term sustainability of the 
debt/GDP ratio should be delegated to an independent body, made accountable to the national 18 
  parliaments. As we point out in the paper, obtaining fiscal discipline need not require such a 
drastic reduction in the political control over the budgetary process, which may be unpalatable to 
national governments. Furthermore, our proposal entails a minimal adjustment in the institutional 
arrangements designed to supervise and regulate the conduct of EMU fiscal policies. By contrast, 
Wyplosz’s scheme is inconsistent with the current EMU status quo, where the Council of Economic 
and Finance Ministers defines the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs).  
Buiter and Grafe (2003), in the context of enlargement, point out that the Pact needs to be re-
oriented towards fiscal sustainability. They suggest a ‘permanent balance rule’ for taxation which 
ensures government solvency, which can be augmented to target a particular debt-GDP ratio. Whilst 
this proposal is simple, in contrast to the analysis presented here, this simplicity is deceptive. It does 
not confront the problem of political distortions in fiscal policy-making, except through the implicit 
assumptions made by policymakers on the future paths of government spending and its components. 
Announcing a sequence of deficit targets, whilst apparently more complex, forces the fiscal 
authorities and the Euro-12 group to confront the underlying assumptions about macroeconomic 
shocks (and their persistence) and can accommodate the possibility of both short, sharp recessions, 
which will require large deficits which are quickly reversed, and shallow periods of stagnation with 
output below potential for a number of years, which require a more gradual adjustment. It combines 
flexibility with commitment. 
The need to preserve the so-called golden rule of deficit financing motivates an alternative 
proposal. This proposal entails a dual budget scheme, where borrowing is allowed to finance public 
investment. Supporters of the SGP argue that implementing the golden rule would leave room to 
fudge the balanced budget rule for adopted for current expenditures and would probably bias public 
investment towards physical capital (Buti, Eijffinger and Franco, 2003). To escape such a criticism, 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) suggest that a fraction of the national budgets devoted to developing 
infrastructure be assigned to an independent body operating at the EMU level.  19 
  Although we focussed on stabilisation policies, our proposal is robust to the 
introduction of deficit-financed investment. In fact, deficit targets could be easily revised to finance 
a temporary surge of public investment. Moreover, national debt and deficit targets could be 
designed taking into account the specific needs of lower-income countries, such as the accession 
countries, who may require faster accumulation of public capital. By the same token, our proposal 
can be amended also to meet the requirement that a budget rule should not hamper structural 
reforms (Razin and Sadka, 2002). In fact a specific provision should be made for governments that 
increase short-term deficits to implement reforms that are bound to improve the debt/GDP ratio in 
the longer run, such as pension reforms.  
To conclude, the key message of the paper is quite simple. Instead of limiting fiscal 
discretion at the time when a policy change may be necessary, EMU institutions should bind later 
on, forcing national governments to stick to their promises. To achieve fiscal discipline, this 
probably is all that matters. 
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